Analysis of Shared Parking Game Model under Dynamic Parking Pricing

https://doi.org/10.61187/mi.v2i1.105

Authors

  • Lv Ke School of Science, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430081, China
  • Yuqiang Feng School of Science, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430081, China
  • Nan Jiang School of Science, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430081, China; School of Systems Science, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
  • Miao Wu School of Science, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430081, China

Keywords:

Evolutionary Game, Dynamic Parking Pricing, Shared Parking, Sensitivity Analysis

Abstract

In recent years, the problem of "parking difficulty" has led to a large number of illegal parking incidents. The shared parking mode has been considered as an effective way to alleviate the conflict between parking supply and demand and urban traffic pressure. To address the issue of illegal parking and promote the development of shared parking, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model with shared platforms and motor vehicle drivers as the main entities. The study investigates the evolutionary stability strategy of the model, conducts sensitivity analysis on model parameters, and further analyzes the impact of highly sensitive parameters on the evolutionary paths of both players in the game. Finally, numerical simulations are performed on dynamic parking pricing standard. The research findings demonstrate that the sensitivity of discounts received by drivers from shared platforms and the additional revenue gained by the shared platform is higher than that of other parameters. Moderately increasing the penalty for illegal parking and the additional revenue of the shared platform can encourage drivers to choose legal parking and promote the development of shared parking. Under given parameterized and periodic parking pricing standard, finally, according to the particle swarm optimization algorithm, a set of relatively optimal parameter values is derived to enable the model to evolve rapidly into a stable state where drivers choose to park legally and the shared platform selects surrounding parking lots. It can effectively reduce the frequency of illegal parking.

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Published

2024-07-23

How to Cite

Ke, L., Feng, Y., Jiang, N., & Wu, M. (2024). Analysis of Shared Parking Game Model under Dynamic Parking Pricing. Management & Innovation, 2(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.61187/mi.v2i1.105